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Choang-tsu’s Butterfly: 
Objects and the Subjective Function of Fantasy
Calum Neill
In the sixth chapter of The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis,
Lacan refers to the Taoist Choang-tsu’s well known parable of the
dream butterfly. Choang-tsu poses the question of how, after waking
from a dream of being a butterfly, he can tell whether he is Choang-tsu
who has woken from the dream of being a butterfly or whether he is the
butterfly now dreaming he is Choang-tsu. This article argues that La-
can’s treatment of the parable allows us to discern two instances of fan-
tasy; the fantasy of being the butterfly and the fantasy of being Choang-
tsu. These two instances help to demonstrate the centrality of the
process of identification to the function of fantasy and allow us to grasp
an ethical dimension entailed in one’s subjective relation to the object(s)
of fantasy.
F rom the mirror stage, we can understand the seeds of fantasy in thesubject’s self-relating as méconnaissance. That is to say, in mis-taking the wholeness perceived in the mirror as a wholeness attrib-
utable to itself, the subject establishes the fantasy of itself as an image, or
what Lacan terms the ideal-ego. Central to this process of (mis)identifica-
tion is the mechanism of seeing and, inseparable from this, being seen. In
the terminology of later Lacan, this is elaborated under the concept of the
gaze. Through his discussion of the gaze as objet petit a in Seminar XI and,
in particular, through his treatment of Choang-tsu’s famous paradox of the
dream of the butterfly, Lacan allows us to apprehend what we might call the
properly subjective function of the fantasy. 
Waking from a dream in which he experienced himself as a butterfly,
Choang-tsu poses himself the question of how he can be certain that he is
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now himself, Choang-tsu, and not the butterfly dreaming that he is Choang-
tsu. Put simply, Choang-tsu’s dilemma can be phrased as that of how we can
know which self is the “real” or authentic self and which self is an illusory,
“invented,” dream version. This should also, perhaps, remind us of the clas-
sical Cartesian quandary as to how he, Descartes, can know he is not dream-
ing when he is “in fact” awake (14). Where Descartes, to an extent, circum-
vents this problem, leading to the conclusion that, even if he is the dream
version, this in itself is indicative of a real Descartes beyond the dream in-
sofar as the dream “copy” necessitates an original from which it is abstract-
ed (15), Lacan’s treatment is a little more involved. For Lacan, Choang-tsu
is correct to pose himself this question for two reasons. First, taking such a
question seriously indicates that one has not fallen so under the sway of the
master signifier as to have foreclosed one’s own division; that is, one does
not assume that one is adequate to one’s perceptions of oneself. In fact, one
does not assume one is one: “When Choang-tsu wakes up, he may ask him-
self whether it is not the butterfly who dreams that he is Choang-tsu. Indeed
he is right, and doubly so, first because it proves he is not mad, he does not
regard himself as absolutely identical with Choang-tsu” (Lacan, Four Fun-
damental Concepts 76). 
In addition to this, the question Choang-tsu poses to himself holds with-
in it a certain truth of Choang-tsu. In a sense, he is the butterfly. The butter-
fly, in Lacan’s reading, cannot be reduced to some mere chimera, an arbi-
trary construct of Choang-tsu’s dream-state. On the contrary, it is as dream
butterfly that Choang-tsu was able to grasp something of his own identity,
namely “that he was, and is, in his essence, that butterfly who paints him-
self with his own colours” (76). For Lacan, it is through this penetration of
the unconscious that something of Choang-tsu can emerge, as opposed to
some social construct or status known as Choang-tsu. This can be reformu-
lated in terms of the relation of the subject to the signifier. What we have in
the parable of Choang-tsu are two signifiers, “Choang-tsu” and “butterfly.”
The subject, in the proper Lacanian sense, of the parable is that which is rep-
resented between these two signifiers. Phrased otherwise, the subject of the
parable is placed under these two signifiers:
Choang-tsu butterfly
∃ ↓ ∃
It is, however, actually only in the movement between them that the subject
proper emerges.
The difference here, for Lacan, between the dream and “reality” is at-
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tested to by the mechanism of representation. In the dream the subject is rep-
resented as a butterfly, thus confirming something of his subjective apper-
ception. Outside the dream, the subject is represented as Choang-tsu but
feels it necessary to question this representation. This logic of uncertainty is
in itself what points towards the subjective truth of the situation. As a but-
terfly, the subject does not pose the same question as when he is awake:
“when I am not this dream butterfly, when I am awake, am I actually this
dream butterfly?” Lacan’s explanation here and thus his conclusion is that,
as dream butterfly, the subject is but his own representation whereas as
Choang-tsu, he is a social representation: 
when he is the butterfly, the idea does not occur to him to wonder
whether, when he is Choang-tsu awake, he is not the butterfly that he
is dreaming of being. This is because, when dreaming of being the
butterfly, he will no doubt have to bear witness later that he repre-
sented himself as a butterfly. But this does not mean that he is capti-
vated by the butterfly - he is a captive butterfly, but captured by noth-
ing, for, in the dream, he is a butterfly for nobody. It is when he is
awake that he is Choang-tsu for others, and is caught in their butter-
fly net. (76)
The point we can extract from Lacan’s reading of this parable is that the sub-
ject, ∃, cannot be reduced to either instance; neither butterfly nor Choang-
tsu. Neither, however, is the subject properly some entity outwith the two
instances. The subject is not the property of, a pure effect of, the symbolic
order - here that which is fixed under the signifier Choang-tsu - nor can
the subject be reduced to a pure effect of itself (beyond or outwith the
signifying realm). 
In this sense, following ÎiÏek (46), we could understand the dream (and
its content) as the fantasy of the subject wherein the butterfly constitutes the
(representative of the) object: (∃& butterfly). ÎiÏek writes, “In the symbol-
ic reality he was Zhuang Zi [Choang-tsu], but in the real of his desire he was
a butterfly. Being a butterfly was the whole of his positive being outside the
symbolic network” (46). What ÎiÏek’s interpretation occludes is the fact
that, despite the impossibility of inverting the terms of the dream/fantasy to
which ÎiÏek correctly attests, the parable does contain two instances of fan-
tasy. While only one instance can, as Lacan confirms, be understood as a
dream, fantasy is not reducible to dream states - we fantasize when awake
and the unconscious continues to pulsate when awake. While clearly, in ac-
cordance with ÎiÏek’s reading, the butterfly is a fantasized representation of
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the subject such that it can be represented as ∃& butterfly, the parable also
contains the fantasy of being Choang-tsu; ∃& Choang-tsu. What is signifi-
cant in the parable in terms of the light it casts on the notion of fantasy is
that by raising and posing the question of his own identity and, in Lacan’s
words, in “not fully understand[ing] how right he is” (Four Fundamental
Concepts 76), Choang-tsu points us towards the impossibility of the subject
in either position. The subject is that aphanisic point of its own departure;
the subject is nothing but its own division.
In this sense the fantasy embodies a relation to some thing or image
which functions as the objet petit a and thus protects the subject from the
(im)possibility of the traumatic encounter with the Real by masking or ob-
fuscating the site of the lack in the symbolic order. At the same time, and in
a sense it is but a different perspective on the same function, the fantasy
serves to protect the subject from the jouissance of the Real by providing a
surrogate, fantasized, sense of unity.
Through the mode of fantasy we can perceive the mechanism of desire
at work. The objet petit a, as that which causes desire, can be understood to
stand in for the unity we would wish to achieve. In both scenarios posed in
the parable, as we have seen, there is something of an imagined sense of u-
nity at work; I am the butterfly or I am Choang-tsu. In a sense, the psycho-
analytic “reality” is both attested to and negated in both versions - I am nei-
ther the butterfly nor Choang-tsu but I am positioned in response to my con-
ceptualization of myself as the butterfly and Choang-tsu. The truth of the
subject is the mark of desire inscribed in both fantasies. The Lacanian point
here would thus not be that the dream can be equated to fantasy and the wak-
ing state could not, but rather that both dream and waking state attest to the
same fundamental fantasy, albeit in necessarily different modes. 
As noted above, the fact that the Other is lacking points to the neces-
sary or constitutive lack in the subject. In encountering the Other as lacking,
the subject should be seen as not so much encountering the void of the Real,
but rather that point on the signifying chain which is indicative of the ex-
sistence of this void. This allows us to understand the subject as resorting to
or finding support in fantasy as a veil for this lacking both in the Other, the
symbolic field, and in the subject itself. It is as such that the object of fan-
tasy, that in relation to which the subject places itself in fantasy, constitutes
the cause of subjective desire and thus constitutes the subject proper as sub-
ject of desire. Without the function of fantasy the subject would fail to mo-
bilize itself. That is to say, it would not properly be (a) subject: “in its fun-
damental use, the fantasy is the means by which the subject maintains him-
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self at the level of his vanishing desire, vanishing inasmuch as the very sat-
isfaction of demand deprives him of his object” (Lacan, “Direction of the
Treatment” 532). The castration of the subject, the dividing and alienating
effect of the symbolic order as it functions at one and the same time to al-
low the possibility of the subject and to deny the subject the coherence it
might (impossibly) have otherwise enjoyed, is attested to in the intercession
of Demand. The desire which then arises as one effect of this intercession is
caused, set in motion, by the object of fantasy. But this object, attesting as it
does to the state before castration, before the intercession of demand, is
never actually available to be attained. Fantasy is thus the mode whereby the
subject can “flirt” with the (semblance of the) object in a relatively secure
manner. In this sense, fantasy can be understood as the provision of a surro-
gate jouissance which, as surrogate, serves to guard the subject against Real
jouissance by masking the lacking point in the symbolic network which is
indicative of the (possibility) of the emergence of the Real.
The relation of the function of fantasy to the symbolic field, that the
fantasy is that which covers over the lack in the symbolic and thus functions
as a support for the symbolic insofar as the subject relates to it, indicates that
fantasy not only offers a certain (illusory) coherence for the subject in terms
of his own self-identity but it also confers an equally illusory coherence on
“reality” (as it is mediated in terms of the Other). Properly, these should not
be understood as two distinct moments. The subject’s identity is always
symbolically effected and the symbolic reality to which the fantasy lends
some coherence is always a subjective representation. The identity thus se-
cured in the mode of fantasy is indicative of the desire both to identify one-
self, to “find” or construct one’s identity, and to do so in relation to some-
thing mediated and structured by the symbolic network.
The fantasy in this sense encapsulates what it is that the subject wants,
albeit in a surrogate form. That is, the object standing in for objet petit a is
never it and thus fantasy can and will necessarily move on to another object
which will also not be it. It also provides some answer to what it is that the
Other wants, in the sense that it offers the possibility of an explanation of
what it is that the Other is lacking and why it is that the Other is lacking. A-
gain, this is not to suggest that the answer is found, that we can actually
solve the lack in the Other, but that this lack is obfuscated by an (impossi-
ble and) illusory answer (Stavrakakis 47, 150-52). It is in this sense, again,
that Lacan can assert that it is fantasy which is the support of the desire, not
the object (Four Fundamental Concepts 185).
Fantasy is thus that within the subject which attempts to shore up both
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its own constitutive lack and the lack in the Other. This operation is made
possible by the objet petit a, that remainder of the Real which insists on the
subject, both indicating and serving to mask and protect against the trauma
of the Real. Crucial to the logic of fantasy and desire, however, is the im-
possibility inherent in its operation. Were the objet petit a, the object of fan-
tasy, to be attained, the subject would be faced with the very trauma which
the fantasy serves to protect it from. It is thus that desire must be understood
as a perpetual movement, not in the sense of the drive whose aim is its ulti-
mate goal but in the sense that the object which causes it would, if attained,
negate its very own function.
Perhaps the quintessential example of the fantasy would be that of
love as original unity as presented in Plato’s The Symposium. Plato has
Aristophanes tell us of how humanity once consisted of three genders,
male, female and hermaphrodite, and how each individual of whichever
gender was complete in itself through combining what we would now un-
derstand as the attributes of two people: four hands, four legs, two faces
etc. Due to these creatures’ ambition and power, they were considered a
threat to the Gods who decided to split each one into two halves. Because,
however, each creature had previously formed a whole with its other half,
they clung to them and, if separated, searched for them relentlessly (25-
28). The myth, as it has come to pass into popular culture, has us each in
restless pursuit of our true other half, that other person who would really
complete us. 
This example illustrates the different functions performed in fantasy.
Firstly, it proffers an identity, the answer to the question of who I really am;
I am really the other half of my lost other half. Secondly, it does so with ref-
erence to the promise of a wholeness to come; when I find my lost other
half, I will again be complete and everything will be perfect. Lastly, it offers
an excuse as to why things are not (yet) perfect, why it is that both I and the
world are lacking. Through each of these complementary functions, the fan-
tasy serves to forestall any final resolution. When we do find or think we
have found our lost other half, the girl or boy of our dreams, it inevitably
turns out that they are not quite the magical thing we had hoped for, the
world is not suddenly put to rights, nothing is really perfect and thus they
cannot be it and the hope can continue that the real Platonic other half is still
“out there.”
Crucial in understanding this function of the fantasy is the appreciation
that the fantasy works to situate the subject. The fantasy is not experienced
as a passive scene, the straightforward construct of the subject. As evident
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in the example of Choang-tsu’s butterfly, the fantasy always looks back or,
properly speaking, the fantasy embodies the gaze. This can be seen equally
in the example from The Symposium where the gaze returned from the fanta-
sized conjoining of lost pairs can be understood to situate the subject as not-
one. That is to say, the element of self-perception evident in fantasy demon-
strates something of the distance between the subject and the objet petit a.
This points to one of the fundamental operations of, and thus lessons to
be learnt from, psychoanalysis, that of “traversing the fantasy.” If, as we have
seen, the formula of fantasy (∃&a) describes the subject in relation to objet
petit a, this indicates that the fantasy presents the subject in relation to what
it would take to be the object cause of its desire. Traversing, crossing over the
fantasy, would thus involve the assumption of responsibility for the cause of
one’s own desire and thus of one’s own cause as subject, as without desire
the subject cannot come to be. Traversing the fantasy would thus involve as-
suming a position of responsibility towards (the function of) one’s fantasy -
that is to say, assuming the role of the cause of desire and thus accepting the
perpetual sliding of the objet petit a. Put simply, traversing the fantasy entails
accepting one’s desire for what it is, accepting one’s desire as intermin-
ably bound to the desire of the Other, and not attaching oneself to the
illusory dream of attaining impossible lost jouissance “elsewhere.” It entails
confronting that which the gaze would show, “the essence of the gaze,” that
we paint ourselves in our own colours (Lacan, Four Fundamental Con-
cepts 76).
Graphically this could be represented as (∃&a); i.e. the subject assum-
ing responsibility for the (object as) cause.1 It must be kept in mind, how-
ever, that such an assumption is never a permanent effect. Desire is in per-
petual movement and the subject in question is the barred subject of the un-
conscious, not some monadic subject of pure being. Thus, the pulsative na-
ture of the unconscious must be accounted for. The subject emerges as pul-
sation in and through the symbolic realm and it is only thus that the opera-
tion of traversing the fantasy can be enacted, as speech: 
what’s important is to teach the subject to name, to articulate, to bring
this desire into existence, this desire which, quite literally, is on the
side of existence, which is why it insists. If desire doesn’t dare to
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1. This should not be confused with (a&∃), with the subject exchanging places with the
object as cause, which would be the formula of the perverse fantasy wherein the sub-
ject places itself in the position of object.
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speak its name, it’s because the subject hasn’t yet caused this name to
come forth.
That the subject should come to recognise and to name his desire,
that is the efficacious action of analysis. But it isn’t a question of
recognising something which would be entirely given, ready to be
coapted. In naming it, the subject creates, brings forth, a new presence
in the world. (Lacan, The Ego in Freud’s Theory 228-29) 
Insofar as the objet petit a is, as such, not, that which attains to the po-
sition of objet petit a is always necessarily a functionary of the subject. This
is not, however, to suggest that there is something “out there” chosen by the
subject which would provide the lost jouissance implied by objet petit a, but
rather that the subject has, in the mode of fantasy, chosen something to func-
tion as the necessary surrogate of the object cause of desire. In so naming
this desire, and thus constituting it, the subject puts itself in a position to
claim responsibility for it. As desire is that which motivates and constitutes
the subject, this naming and bringing forth allows the subject to assume re-
sponsibility for itself and thus assume a subjective position which is not in
thrall to, though it is, clearly, still dependent upon, the Other. 
Traversing the fantasy thus returns us to one interpretation of the La-
canian imperative Wo Es war, Soll ich werden, “there where it was, I must
come to be.” It also sheds some light on Lacan’s emphasis on desire in his
seminar on Ethics when he asks, “Have you acted in conformity with the de-
sire that is in you?” (Ethics of Psychoanalysis 314) or declares that “the on-
ly thing of which one can be guilty is of having given ground relative to
one’s desire” (319).
Wo Es war, soll Ich werden in this context would thus indicate the
movement, the traversing, from the subjugated subject of fantasy, wherein
the subject is (perceived as) constituted by, caused as subject of desire by,
the elusive objet petit a, to a position of subjectivity wherein it, the subject,
is its own cause. We could thus reformulate the dictum “Where It was, there
must I come into being” as “Where the object was (perceived to be the cause
my desire), there shall I come to be (the cause of my own desire).” Such a
shift is a radical realtering of the subjective position from which one speaks.
It is clear also, however, that such a realtering is and can only be momen-
tary as, in enunciating and thus creating its desire, the subject necessarily
does so in the mode of the Other; i.e. language. The function of fantasy per-
sists, the gaze cannot be escaped. The desire the subject brings into exis-
tence through its enunciation is necessarily passed over into the realm of the
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Other (desire is still the desire of the Other), but through the process of e-
nunciating its desire the subject can succeed in repositioning itself and thus
attaining something of its own.
Here we can see that traversing the fantasy does not entail a “getting
over” or moving beyond fantasy in any absolute sense. It is not that the sub-
ject who has traversed the fantasy will no longer have any need of such a
function. Fantasy is a necessity in subjective life in order to avoid the trau-
matic effects of the Real and to accept castration. Rather, traversing the fan-
tasy involves the formation or configuration of a new fantasy which allows
or reflects the assumption of a “new” subjective position in relation to the
Other and the Other’s desire. Such a (re)formation of the subjective position
is the moment of Wo Es war, soll Ich werden, wherein the subject (∃) as-
sumes a position in that place previously occupied by the Other or the dis-
course of the Other. Such a moment, the traversing of fantasy, can then be
understood to be a moment of (taking) responsibility, a retroactive assump-
tion of responsibility for the position one will have come to occupy. Such
occupation and its concomitant responsibility is indicative of a temporaliza-
tion which resists temporalization. It is not the “despite what has been, I will
be” of ego-psychology but rather a reconfiguration of and assumption of re-
sponsibility for the very relation of cause and effect which might be taken
as having or having been seen to have occurred.
This retroactive positing of the subject’s responsibility is one which oc-
curs within what Lacan terms logical, rather than chronological, time. This
points towards an understanding of the relationship between cause and ef-
fect which unsettles traditional or received notions of what such a relation-
ship would “naturally” be in any given situation and emphasizes the as-
sumptive and forced qualities of this relationship. Simply put, the uninvest-
ed, received notion that A is (and always is) the cause of B in any (compa-
rable) circumstance is put under question: “cause is a concept that, in the last
resort, is unanalysable - impossible to understand by reason - if indeed the
rule of reason, the Vernunftregel, is always some Vergleichung, or equiva-
lent - and that there remains essentially in the function of cause a certain
gap” (Four Fundamental Concepts 21). 
This logic can also be detected in Lacan’s statement concerning not
ceding or giving ground relative to one’s desire. By allowing the relation
with the object to pertain in such a way that the object is Other, that is, that
the subject finds its cause in something radically external to itself, the sub-
ject cannot yet bring itself to be in a properly subjective position. The
assignation of cause is always a retroactive and subjective effect. By as-
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signing the role of cause to something else, the subject denies itself and
places itself under the sway of the Other, albeit in a deluded form. It is on-
ly through the subjective assumption of the cause that the subject allows
its own possibility.
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